The US Is Bombing Iran and Buying Its Oil on the Same Day

On March 20, 2026 — Day 21 of the Iran war — the US Treasury issued a 30-day waiver allowing 140 million barrels of Iranian crude oil already loaded on vessels to be sold freely on global markets. On the same day, 2,500 additional US Marines were deploying to the Gulf. Neither side had agreed to ceasefire talks. Both sides said the other had been defeated.

That contradiction is now the defining feature of this conflict. The Pakistan perspective on this split captures how differently the same war lands depending on which end of the supply chain you're standing on.

Two Waivers, Two Wars

The Iranian oil waiver follows a near-identical move the week prior — a pattern Albis has been tracking through the Iran topic hub: on March 12, the US Treasury eased sanctions on Russian oil to allow deliveries to India. Both decisions were framed as pragmatic energy management. Both directly fund economies the US is simultaneously opposing — Iran militarily, Russia through Ukraine.

The Ukraine framing was made explicit by Ukrainian media, which called the Russian waiver "war financing." The Iranian waiver follows the same logic: the US is now buying Iranian oil while bombing Iranian infrastructure, a contradiction visible to every regional audience except the US domestic one, where it's presented as supply chain management.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the 140 million barrels would "bring some relief to global energy supply." Brent crude had touched $112 intraday on March 20 before settling at $108 on the waiver news. Goldman Sachs maintained its forecast of triple-digit oil through 2027 unless Hormuz reopens by April.

The War Nobody Wants to End

Iran fired two intermediate-range ballistic missiles at Diego Garcia — the joint US-UK base in the Indian Ocean — in the 72 hours preceding today. Neither hit. The strikes confirmed Iran retains missiles capable of reaching roughly 4,000 kilometres from its territory, further than previously assessed. The IRGC framed it as a demonstration that the war had moved beyond the Middle East.

It has. The conflict now spans four active fronts: Iran (US-Israeli air campaign, now Day 22), Lebanon (Israeli ground operations south of the Litani River, with over one million displaced), the Persian Gulf (Iranian strikes on energy infrastructure across six GCC states), and Pakistan-Afghanistan (where a five-day Eid truce expires Monday at midnight).

Iran's new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, rejected a US truce proposal delivered through two intermediaries, according to Reuters. He issued a written Nowruz message on March 20 calling the enemy "defeated" and naming 1404 the "year of resistance economy under national unity." He has not appeared on video or in public since assuming power on March 9.

Trump's position mirrors the surface contradiction. He said Friday the US was "considering winding down" operations — before departing for Florida as two B-52H strategic bombers (nuclear-capable) were tracked heading toward the Middle East. He added: "You don't declare a ceasefire when you are annihilating the other side."

Both of these things — winding down and escalating — are happening simultaneously. That's not contradictory on its own terms. It reflects the gap between the rhetorical track (signalling off-ramps to financial markets and domestic audiences) and the military track (deploying more forces, seizing operational momentum before any diplomatic framework forms).

Hormuz: A Two-Tier World Takes Shape

As of March 15, 11 China-linked vessels had transited Hormuz since March 1, according to Lloyd's List Intelligence. Mainstream Chinese tanker owners still avoided the route. Pakistan's national shipping corporation transited with AIS active. India negotiated bilateral access. Japan is in active talks with Iran's Foreign Minister Araghchi for passage rights.

Araghchi said in a Kyodo News interview: "We have not closed the strait — it is open." What he meant was: it is open to countries Iran designates as non-hostile. Every ship from a Western-aligned nation remains at risk. The distinction is doing considerable work.

Iran is also studying a transit fee system. Turkish media confirmed at least one tanker has already paid approximately $2 million for guaranteed passage. If that system formalises, Hormuz becomes the first major international waterway to charge selective tolls in the modern era — a precedent with implications well beyond this war.

The US is running A-10 Warthog gunships and Apache helicopters against Iranian speedboats to reopen the strait kinetically, while simultaneously exempting Iranian tankers from sanctions so their oil can reach markets. Both operations are happening at the same time, in the same body of water, with the same stated goal of price stabilisation.

Pakistan's Ticking Clock

The Pakistan-Afghanistan Eid ceasefire expires at midnight on Monday, March 23–24. Pakistan's information minister made the threshold explicit: any drone attack or terrorist incident inside Pakistan restarts Operation Ghazab-lil-Haq immediately.

Pakistan entered this truce in a structurally compromised position. Its monthly oil import bill is projected at $600 million — roughly double the pre-war figure — directly because of the Hormuz blockade. The Iranian oil waiver may provide marginal relief, but Pakistan's IMF programme is under strain and its 26-day fuel reserves are being drawn down. Schools have been closed. Petrol prices rose 20 percent on March 6 and are projected to climb again.

The Taliban ceasefire was brokered by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey — none of whom had the bandwidth normally needed for such a mediation. Qatar is absorbing a 13 percent GDP hit from Iran's destruction of 17 percent of its LNG capacity. Saudi Arabia is defending its own eastern oil infrastructure from Iranian drone strikes. Turkey's central bank cited the Iran war explicitly in its latest inflation assessment.

That these three states found the capacity to broker a ceasefire regardless tells you something about regional priorities. The US was not involved.

The connection between the two theatres runs through oil. Afghanistan had pivoted west in 2025, routing trade through Iran after Pakistan border closures. The Iran war disrupted that route. The Taliban is now economically boxed from both sides — Pakistan military pressure from the east, Iranian trade disruption from the west. That box tightens after Monday.

How Different Regions See It

Western media frames the Iranian oil waiver as pragmatic energy management and leads with Trump's "winding down" language. That framing dominates the US and European news cycle.

Arabic media presents a different picture. Iran struck 39 energy sites across 9 countries in 21 days. Qatar lost 17 percent of LNG capacity for up to five years. Kuwait's refineries have been hit twice. Saudi Arabia's Riyadh region absorbed drone strikes. Gulf Arabic media leads with food security — 85 percent of Gulf food imports pass through Hormuz — not oil prices, which is the frame Western audiences encounter.

Chinese media draws a sharper conclusion. Guancha, the state-linked commentary platform, has run the headline: "Only Chinese ships and Iranian ships can pass Hormuz." Xinhua analysed the Hormuz situation as proof the US "has the heart but not the strength." The same military operation reads as freedom of navigation restoration in Washington and strategic decline in Beijing.

Indian media doesn't cover the alliance fracture. The war is a supply chain problem: 9,000 Indian nationals trapped in the Gulf, an LPG cylinder shortage, and a crude basket price of $156 a barrel — far above the Brent headline because of India's heavy crude mix. The diplomatic dual-play — buying sanctioned Russian oil and Iranian oil while maintaining US alignment — doesn't appear domestically because no framing forces it visible.

What Hasn't Been Asked

The back channel between Washington and Tehran exists. Axios confirmed Witkoff and Araghchi are in contact, both sides denying it. Oman's foreign minister confirmed pre-war nuclear negotiations were "making progress" when the strikes began February 28.

The question that neither side's domestic media fully surfaces: if Iran was negotiating in good faith and the talks were progressing, what changed the calculus in the 72 hours before the strikes launched? That question lives mostly in specialist outlets and opposition media. It's the question with the most consequence for what comes after.

Iran wants a "complete, comprehensive and lasting end to the war" — not a ceasefire, which it frames as temporary and reversible. The US wants an outcome it can call victory without the word "deal." Those aren't the same thing. A back channel that satisfies both is theoretically possible. No one has said what it looks like.

What to Watch

The Pakistan-Afghanistan ceasefire expires Monday night. Resumption of fighting after the truce would coincide with Pakistan's peak economic pressure and end the only active diplomatic track in either conflict.

Mojtaba Khamenei's continued invisibility shapes the diplomatic calculus. If he remains absent on video, the IRGC retains effective operational command of Iran's war strategy with no civilian counterweight. That makes any ceasefire harder to verify and trust.

The 30-day Iranian oil waiver expires April 19. If Hormuz remains restricted at that date and the waiver is not renewed, the supply shock resumes from a baseline of structural market adaptation rather than acute panic. Markets may be less flexible the second time.

The Diego Garcia missile strikes — the furthest Iran has struck in this conflict — signal that the geographic boundaries of the war are not fixed. Every US installation within intermediate-range ballistic missile distance of Iran is now in a different risk category than it was 30 days ago.

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Sources: Reuters, Guardian, NYT, CNBC, ISW, Lloyd's List Intelligence, Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, The Hindu, Kyodo News, EADaily, Daily Pakistan